Well, that's a really good example actually. The key to any systems view is the point that the whole is different than the sum of its parts. So, if there are wholes that don't make the cut based on logic that applies to the parts, we have a substantial problem with all science that isn't physics. Which might go a long way towards explaining the fundamentalist view of physics as truth and as reality. Aunt Hillary isn't a particularly far fetched metaphor. Especially considering what it is a metaphor for, so to speak.[/QUOTE]subsymbolic;678912 wrote:Aunt Hillary supernatural? The horror.BWE;678902 wrote:As much as Hofstadter gets a bad rap these days, the weird recursiveness of self reference in systems of pure logic (coding/decoding) is a thing. And, while there are formal axiomatic systems which avoid godel incompleteness, the issue of self reference can't escape the trap.Grendel;678865 wrote:I'm not a metaphysical naturalist just because I posted in this thread. I'm not one even if I didn't post in this thread.
I totally get your point that whatever I say is subjective to me, and that in order to be as objective as possible, my opinion that the sun will rise tomorrow cannot be a fact before it rises. Things must occur sequentially if they are to occur at all. Causation is paramount. That there can be no laws of physics without first having a valid meta-physics
I got it, thank you.
What can one say about Godel? Moo?
If there is a place for mystical approaches to ontologies, that's not a bad place to start. That plus the actual relativity of time. So, while mu may seem like a joke there, I would suggest that it might be more apt than we accept at first glance.
I think that's about where Max Tegmark comes in.
Or physics has a real problem if it is to be considered that arbiter of reality.
I picked the example quite deliberately.
Here's a quick vade mecum for those unfamiliar:
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/course ... dsi11.html
The B/T argument makes a step Hofstadter didn't make, demonstrating that some tasks performed using logic or maths at the agent level are systematically irreducible to the 'ant' level or below. This can be seen clearly by imagining Laplace's demon trying to predict the behavior of an agent that has decided to try to solve B/T and turn left if there are two balls and right if there is only one. Given all the physical information available and using the laws of physics Laplace will always predict right. The agent, using logic, will always turn right. In other words, that's a nice tidy and easy to grasp proof of Davidson's anomalous monism.