What is Metaphysical Naturalism?

[Abominable Intelligence]

I'm curious. What the fuck is metaphysical naturalism?
If something exists, it is natural and not metaphysical. In other words, for the sake of argument, if ghosts existed, they would be natural.

The whole notion of metaphysicalism is a contradiction in terms.

[Jobar]

Was it Paul Kurtz who came up with that term?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_naturalism

[Abominable Intelligence]

Well I think it's a shitty name. There is nothing metaphysical about naturalism.

[Jobar]

Mr. Webster calls metaphysics "the field of philosophy which deals with the first principles of things." MN would have it that naturalism is such a first principle- indeed, it should be the ultimate principle. I see no problem with that.

[subsymbolic]

What Jobar said: starting off with the assumption that naturalism is the way forward.

[Abominable Intelligence]

It's still a shit name. It would be better to say "Naturalism is the metaphysics of choice for scientific enquiry."

[subsymbolic]

[quote=""Abominable Intelligence""]It's still a shit name. It would be better to say "Naturalism is the metaphysics of choice for scientific enquiry."[/quote]

Why? That's not what it means at all.

[Abominable Intelligence]

It's a shit name. Deal wiv it.

[subsymbolic]

[quote=""Abominable Intelligence""]It's a shit name. Deal wiv it.[/quote]

Says the digital recipe burger tosser

[Shake]

I've been engaged in discussion with a creationist in YouTube comments who claims to have studied evolutionary theory at a high level in college and was able to use the terminology, etc., in the classes in order to pass, all the while secretly disagreeing with what he was being taught. I think he claims this in order to give himself some sort of credibility in his attempts to debunk modern evolutionary theory. He's already shown some weaknesses in his arguments and in his use of shifting the goalposts, but one of his biggest gripes is that myself and others are ignoring the "metaphysical first principles" which he claims are the basis for proofs of god's existence. I've argued that he's no better than the standard presuppositionalist such as Matt Slick or Sye Ten Bruggencate, however, he even distances himself from and tries to differentiate his point of view on the Kalam cosmological argument by going back to metaphysics. Thanks to the link in Jobar's post, I see even more clearly where his argument falls apart:

If it is important for Americans to learn about science and evolution, decoupling the two forms of naturalism is essential strategy. ... I suggest that scientists can defuse some of the opposition to evolution by first recognizing that the vast majority of Americans are believers, and that most Americans want to retain their faith. It is demonstrable that individuals can retain religious beliefs and still accept evolution as science. Scientists should avoid confusing the methodological naturalism of science with metaphysical naturalism.
— Eugenie C. Scott, Creationism, Ideology, and Science

Of course, my opponent is perhaps purposefully being vague in doing precisely what I have bolded in the above quote.

He sort of shrugged off my accusation of him presupposing god's existence, claiming the universe itself is evidence all the while accusing me of being a materialist who has his own presuppositions which somehow then validate his claim.

My study of philosophy was rather rusty, but when I looked into his "metaphysical first principles" a little deeper to refresh myself, I was able to easily shred his arguments as they are still ultimately grounded in assertions, ones which he still cannot show to be true. I mean, he's trying to go back to a First Cause. I asked for something to show that this is necessarily his god. He's got nothing, of course.

[subsymbolic]

Metaphysics IS the first principles. Your interlocutor has committed the first error of the bullshitter: He's unwittingly demonstrated that he doesn't know what the technical word he is throwing about means.

So if he wants to talk about the first principles of first principles, take him at his word and ask him to explain clearly what those first principles are.

First principles should be neutral about things and assuming the thing that you want to prove is pretty well the definition of begging the question.

https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/begging-the-question

[Shake]

[quote=""subsymbolic""]Metaphysics IS the first principles. Your interlocutor has committed the first error of the bullshitter: He's unwittingly demonstrated that he doesn't know what the technical word he is throwing about means.

So if he wants to talk about the first principles of first principles, take him at his word and ask him to explain clearly what those first principles are.

First principles should be neutral about things and assuming the thing that you want to prove is pretty well the definition of begging the question.

https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/begging-the-question[/quote]

Thanks for all of that. It was very helpful. I already knew he was begging the question. It's not the only fallacy he's committed; he's been straw-manning me since the start and most recently tried to use his MBA to make him look important to us, attempting an argument from authority fallacy. Well, I called him out on that BS as well as his misunderstanding of technical terms. I believe I mentioned how he supposedly took some high-level biology classes where he heard about (I hesitate to say 'learned') evolutionary theory, yet he actually used the term "kinds" in a post! Then when I politely stated that "kinds" is not a scientific term, and further requested that if he used it could he please describe how he means that word, he responded in a rude tone stating that he could use it however he likes.

[Cheerful Charlie]

[quote=""Abominable Intelligence""]I'm curious. What the fuck is metaphysical naturalism?
If something exists, it is natural and not metaphysical. In other words, for the sake of argument, if ghosts existed, they would be natural.

The whole notion of metaphysicalism is a contradiction in terms.[/quote]

It is the proposition that there is no supernatural realm, and that such notions never prove useful or fruitful and that should be a basic understanding of how the Universe works.

Methodological naturalism is the basis of science, it excludes super-naturalism, substance dualism, vitalism, et al

Metaphysical naturalism goes deeper, pointing out such ideas have never been demonstrable or useful. This shifts the burden of proof on the shoulders of those who claim such things exist. The principle here is that of the null hypothesis. It is not enough to state a hypothesis, it must be demonstrably true and fruitful.

Supernaturalism et al have not met that burden of evidence or proof. and it is not the skeptic's burden to disprove these things, any more than we can disprove Russell's Teapot.

This is a straight forward challenge to supernaturalism as a core principle.

Evidence talks, bullshit walks.

[Grendel]

[subsymbolic]

[quote=""Cheerful Charlie""]

I'm curious. What the fuck is metaphysical naturalism?
If something exists, it is natural and not metaphysical. In other words, for the sake of argument, if ghosts existed, they would be natural.

The whole notion of metaphysicalism is a contradiction in terms.

It is the proposition that there is no supernatural realm, and that such notions never prove useful or fruitful and that should be a basic understanding of how the Universe works.

Methodological naturalism is the basis of science, it excludes super-naturalism, substance dualism, vitalism, et al

Metaphysical naturalism goes deeper, pointing out such ideas have never been demonstrable or useful. This shifts the burden of proof on the shoulders of those who claim such things exist. The principle here is that of the null hypothesis. It is not enough to state a hypothesis, it must be demonstrably true and fruitful.

Supernaturalism et al have not met that burden of evidence or proof. and it is not the skeptic's burden to disprove these things, any more than we can disprove Russell's Teapot.

This is a straight forward challenge to supernaturalism as a core principle.

Evidence talks, bullshit walks.[/QUOTE]

How does metaphysical naturalism manage to demonstrate what is useful, fruitful or proven in advance of assuming metaphysical naturalism? You can't use the system you want to justify in the justification of that system.

To put it another way, working out your metaphysics is working out what counts as evidence, useful or proof (and so on). Metaphysical naturalism is, and can only be, an assumption, an axiom.

If you want to make the claim you have as a metaphysical statement you are making the same mistake as The Faithful when they assert that the bible is true because it says so in the bible. It's precisely this that makes discussion between the two sides so hard. Faith and science cannot even agree on a neutral metaphysics that allow them to disagree more fruitfully elsewhere.

Enjoy the walk.

[plebian]

I want to know how we could identify anything supernatural if not by its regular natural properties. Earlier in the thread, someone said this or that sort of statement or person or something referred to the abrahamic god. Well, that doesn't help. Define any supernatural property you like but try to do it without referring to natural properties. All I'm left with as a remainder is "a vague, inconsistent idea about nothing".

[Cheerful Charlie]

[quote=""subsymbolic""]

I'm curious. What the fuck is metaphysical naturalism?
If something exists, it is natural and not metaphysical. In other words, for the sake of argument, if ghosts existed, they would be natural.

The whole notion of metaphysicalism is a contradiction in terms.

It is the proposition that there is no supernatural realm, and that such notions never prove useful or fruitful and that should be a basic understanding of how the Universe works.

Methodological naturalism is the basis of science, it excludes super-naturalism, substance dualism, vitalism, et al

Metaphysical naturalism goes deeper, pointing out such ideas have never been demonstrable or useful. This shifts the burden of proof on the shoulders of those who claim such things exist. The principle here is that of the null hypothesis. It is not enough to state a hypothesis, it must be demonstrably true and fruitful.

Supernaturalism et al have not met that burden of evidence or proof. and it is not the skeptic's burden to disprove these things, any more than we can disprove Russell's Teapot.

This is a straight forward challenge to supernaturalism as a core principle.

Evidence talks, bullshit walks.

How does metaphysical naturalism manage to demonstrate what is useful, fruitful or proven in advance of assuming metaphysical naturalism? You can't use the system you want to justify in the justification of that system.

To put it another way, working out your metaphysics is working out what counts as evidence, useful or proof (and so on). Metaphysical naturalism is, and can only be, an assumption, an axiom.

If you want to make the claim you have as a metaphysical statement you are making the same mistake as The Faithful when they assert that the bible is true because it says so in the bible. It's precisely this that makes discussion between the two sides so hard. Faith and science cannot even agree on a neutral metaphysics that allow them to disagree more fruitfully elsewhere.

Enjoy the walk.[/QUOTE]

There are some ideas, supernaturalism, occultism, vitalism, mysticism et al that simply do not have any evidence to support their bare existence, much less details. Such things are used only to prop up other claims that are unproven, have no evidence to support them, and in the end, it is special pleading at best.

The question is, what to do about teapot claims? The answer with metaphysical naturalism is to rule them out because they cannot be proven, and don't seem to exist if we go by evidence.

This leads to logical explosion. If we allow such nonsense, we allow all nonsense and achieve intellectual nihilism. One can always use supernaturalism as a gap creator to stick God into. And related concepts.

So there are good reasons to hold to metaphysical naturalism. It eliminates a lot of nonsense that has not been demonstrated but rests on shaky foundations. Once the logical problems of the God proposition surface, any sort of unprovable nonsense and, special pleading, the theologian can make up is offered up in an attempt to at least make their nested hypotheses coherent. But evidence is never given for anything.

The problem is that theologians use this sort of argument in a fashion they would not allow in the matter of teapots, fairies or unicorns. It is a sort of pathological irrationality meant mainly to prop up a series of propositions about God and God's nature.

Metaphysical naturalism is a basic foundation of sound reason and rationality.

[plebian]

[quote=""Cheerful Charlie""]

I'm curious. What the fuck is metaphysical naturalism?
If something exists, it is natural and not metaphysical. In other words, for the sake of argument, if ghosts existed, they would be natural.

The whole notion of metaphysicalism is a contradiction in terms.

It is the proposition that there is no supernatural realm, and that such notions never prove useful or fruitful and that should be a basic understanding of how the Universe works.

Methodological naturalism is the basis of science, it excludes super-naturalism, substance dualism, vitalism, et al

Metaphysical naturalism goes deeper, pointing out such ideas have never been demonstrable or useful. This shifts the burden of proof on the shoulders of those who claim such things exist. The principle here is that of the null hypothesis. It is not enough to state a hypothesis, it must be demonstrably true and fruitful.

Supernaturalism et al have not met that burden of evidence or proof. and it is not the skeptic's burden to disprove these things, any more than we can disprove Russell's Teapot.

This is a straight forward challenge to supernaturalism as a core principle.

Evidence talks, bullshit walks.

How does metaphysical naturalism manage to demonstrate what is useful, fruitful or proven in advance of assuming metaphysical naturalism? You can't use the system you want to justify in the justification of that system.

To put it another way, working out your metaphysics is working out what counts as evidence, useful or proof (and so on). Metaphysical naturalism is, and can only be, an assumption, an axiom.

If you want to make the claim you have as a metaphysical statement you are making the same mistake as The Faithful when they assert that the bible is true because it says so in the bible. It's precisely this that makes discussion between the two sides so hard. Faith and science cannot even agree on a neutral metaphysics that allow them to disagree more fruitfully elsewhere.

Enjoy the walk.

There are some ideas, supernaturalism, occultism, vitalism, mysticism et al that simply do not have any evidence to support their bare existence, much less details. Such things are used only to prop up other claims that are unproven, have no evidence to support them, and in the end, it is special pleading at best.

The question is, what to do about teapot claims? The answer with metaphysical naturalism is to rule them out because they cannot be proven, and don't seem to exist if we go by evidence.

This leads to logical explosion. If we allow such nonsense, we allow all nonsense and achieve intellectual nihilism. One can always use supernaturalism as a gap creator to stick God into. And related concepts.

So there are good reasons to hold to metaphysical naturalism. It eliminates a lot of nonsense that has not been demonstrated but rests on shaky foundations. Once the logical problems of the God proposition surface, any sort of unprovable nonsense and, special pleading, the theologian can make up is offered up in an attempt to at least make their nested hypotheses coherent. But evidence is never given for anything.

The problem is that theologians use this sort of argument in a fashion they would not allow in the matter of teapots, fairies or unicorns. It is a sort of pathological irrationality meant mainly to prop up a series of propositions about God and God's nature.

Metaphysical naturalism is a basic foundation of sound reason and rationality.[/QUOTE]

I absolutely love that pragmatism can justify other ontologies.

I tend to find my comfort zone in the general space defined by the american pragmatists because it's the only system that can answer the question "why does it matter?" from first principles.

[subsymbolic]

[quote=""plebian""]I want to know how we could identify anything supernatural if not by its regular natural properties. Earlier in the thread, someone said this or that sort of statement or person or something referred to the abrahamic god. Well, that doesn't help. Define any supernatural property you like but try to do it without referring to natural properties. All I'm left with as a remainder is "a vague, inconsistent idea about nothing".[/quote]

Give me the right definition of supernatural and it wouldn't be too hard*. I'm objecting to two things: First the idea that scientific realism is the arbiter of all things and second the constant question begging about the metaphysical basis for science.

And then there's declarations like this:

The principle here is that of the null hypothesis. It is not enough to state a hypothesis, it must be demonstrably true and fruitful.

Which are a bit 'seven red lines'.

* Because most of these triumphalist scientistic definitions of 'supernatural' would exclude stuff like the Banach Tarski paradox and the axiom of choice just for a start. To put it another way, a commitment to monism isn't a commitment to scientific realism.

[plebian]

[quote=""subsymbolic""]

I want to know how we could identify anything supernatural if not by its regular natural properties. Earlier in the thread, someone said this or that sort of statement or person or something referred to the abrahamic god. Well, that doesn't help. Define any supernatural property you like but try to do it without referring to natural properties. All I'm left with as a remainder is "a vague, inconsistent idea about nothing".

Give me the right definition of supernatural and it wouldn't be too hard*. I'm objecting to two things: First the idea that scientific realism is the arbiter of all things and second the constant question begging about the metaphysical basis for science.

And then there's declarations like this:

The principle here is that of the null hypothesis. It is not enough to state a hypothesis, it must be demonstrably true and fruitful.

Which are a bit 'seven red lines'.

* Because most of these triumphalist scientistic definitions of 'supernatural' would exclude stuff like the Banach Tarski paradox and the axiom of choice just for a start. To put it another way, a commitment to monism isn't a commitment to scientific realism.[/QUOTE]
We are saying the same thing. Constructs of reality are constructs of reality. The only tool we have to judge them is the consistency of our perceptions.

I haven't seen a definition of supernatural that a remote control doesn't fit if you don't know the mechanism.

[plebian]

[quote=""plebian""]

I want to know how we could identify anything supernatural if not by its regular natural properties. Earlier in the thread, someone said this or that sort of statement or person or something referred to the abrahamic god. Well, that doesn't help. Define any supernatural property you like but try to do it without referring to natural properties. All I'm left with as a remainder is "a vague, inconsistent idea about nothing".

Give me the right definition of supernatural and it wouldn't be too hard*. I'm objecting to two things: First the idea that scientific realism is the arbiter of all things and second the constant question begging about the metaphysical basis for science.

And then there's declarations like this:

The principle here is that of the null hypothesis. It is not enough to state a hypothesis, it must be demonstrably true and fruitful.

Which are a bit 'seven red lines'.

* Because most of these triumphalist scientistic definitions of 'supernatural' would exclude stuff like the Banach Tarski paradox and the axiom of choice just for a start. To put it another way, a commitment to monism isn't a commitment to scientific realism.

We are saying the same thing. Constructs of reality are constructs of reality. The only tool we have to judge them is the consistency of our perceptions.

I haven't seen a definition of supernatural that a remote control doesn't fit if you don't know the mechanism.[/QUOTE]

or of the real that a mental model does fit.

[subsymbolic]

There are some ideas, supernaturalism, occultism, vitalism, mysticism et al that simply do not have any evidence to support their bare existence, much less details. Such things are used only to prop up other claims that are unproven, have no evidence to support them, and in the end, it is special pleading at best.

I'm sure you are right. Can you explain how this responds to my point that you are begging the question.

The question is, what to do about teapot claims? The answer with metaphysical naturalism is to rule them out because they cannot be proven, and don't seem to exist if we go by evidence.

Can you explain how metaphysical naturalism automatically rules out the idea that there might be a teapot circling the sun somewhere between The Earth and Mars. It's a fine rhetorical device, but it isn't a formal argument and as a formal argument, it doesn't actually work for a number of reasons, not least that logic is entirely neutral about the burden of proof.

This leads to logical explosion. If we allow such nonsense, we allow all nonsense and achieve intellectual nihilism. One can always use supernaturalism as a gap creator to stick God into. And related concepts.

No it doesn't. Thankfully we do not exclude Russell's teapot on logical or empirical grounds, but on the grounds that it's a difference that makes no difference and so we don't need to worry about it.

So there are good reasons to hold to metaphysical naturalism. It eliminates a lot of nonsense that has not been demonstrated but rests on shaky foundations.

You are begging the question again.

Once the logical problems of the God proposition surface, any sort of unprovable nonsense and, special pleading, the theologian can make up is offered up in an attempt to at least make their nested hypotheses coherent. But evidence is never given for anything.

Look slagging down a group you don't like isn't actually an argument for something.

The problem is that theologians use this sort of argument in a fashion they would not allow in the matter of teapots, fairies or unicorns.

I'd argue that each of these, if true, would have sod all consequence, while even the most embarrassing atheist fundies would agree that IF God existed, there would be significant consequences.

It is a sort of pathological irrationality meant mainly to prop up a series of propositions about God and God's nature.

Sure, but the faithful would say exactly the same about you and your commitment to a metaphysical stance that begs as many questions as theirs does.

Metaphysical naturalism is a basic foundation of sound reason and rationality.

It really isn't. Logic is.

[subsymbolic]

[quote=""plebian""]

I want to know how we could identify anything supernatural if not by its regular natural properties. Earlier in the thread, someone said this or that sort of statement or person or something referred to the abrahamic god. Well, that doesn't help. Define any supernatural property you like but try to do it without referring to natural properties. All I'm left with as a remainder is "a vague, inconsistent idea about nothing".

Give me the right definition of supernatural and it wouldn't be too hard*. I'm objecting to two things: First the idea that scientific realism is the arbiter of all things and second the constant question begging about the metaphysical basis for science.

And then there's declarations like this:

The principle here is that of the null hypothesis. It is not enough to state a hypothesis, it must be demonstrably true and fruitful.

Which are a bit 'seven red lines'.

* Because most of these triumphalist scientistic definitions of 'supernatural' would exclude stuff like the Banach Tarski paradox and the axiom of choice just for a start. To put it another way, a commitment to monism isn't a commitment to scientific realism.

We are saying the same thing. Constructs of reality are constructs of reality. The only tool we have to judge them is the consistency of our perceptions.

I haven't seen a definition of supernatural that a remote control doesn't fit if you don't know the mechanism.[/QUOTE]


I know. We don't disagree often.

Incidentally, would I be right in assuming that your lot are making sure that just as soon as people remember that climate change is real again, you'll be ready or are you being fake news'ed to death?

[plebian]

[quote=""subsymbolic""]

I want to know how we could identify anything supernatural if not by its regular natural properties. Earlier in the thread, someone said this or that sort of statement or person or something referred to the abrahamic god. Well, that doesn't help. Define any supernatural property you like but try to do it without referring to natural properties. All I'm left with as a remainder is "a vague, inconsistent idea about nothing".

Give me the right definition of supernatural and it wouldn't be too hard*. I'm objecting to two things: First the idea that scientific realism is the arbiter of all things and second the constant question begging about the metaphysical basis for science.

And then there's declarations like this:

The principle here is that of the null hypothesis. It is not enough to state a hypothesis, it must be demonstrably true and fruitful.

Which are a bit 'seven red lines'.

* Because most of these triumphalist scientistic definitions of 'supernatural' would exclude stuff like the Banach Tarski paradox and the axiom of choice just for a start. To put it another way, a commitment to monism isn't a commitment to scientific realism.

We are saying the same thing. Constructs of reality are constructs of reality. The only tool we have to judge them is the consistency of our perceptions.

I haven't seen a definition of supernatural that a remote control doesn't fit if you don't know the mechanism.

I know. We don't disagree often.

Incidentally, would I be right in assuming that your lot are making sure that just as soon as people remember that climate change is real again, you'll be ready or are you being fake news'ed to death?[/QUOTE]

Oh God I don't even want to talk about it. I happen to be involved in commerce related work so I fly under the radar but it's like knowing the asteroid is going to hit on such and such a date but it's still a longish time off but not that long that it doesn't feel immanent.

[subsymbolic]

[quote=""plebian""]

Give me the right definition of supernatural and it wouldn't be too hard*. I'm objecting to two things: First the idea that scientific realism is the arbiter of all things and second the constant question begging about the metaphysical basis for science.

And then there's declarations like this:



Which are a bit 'seven red lines'.

* Because most of these triumphalist scientistic definitions of 'supernatural' would exclude stuff like the Banach Tarski paradox and the axiom of choice just for a start. To put it another way, a commitment to monism isn't a commitment to scientific realism.

We are saying the same thing. Constructs of reality are constructs of reality. The only tool we have to judge them is the consistency of our perceptions.

I haven't seen a definition of supernatural that a remote control doesn't fit if you don't know the mechanism.

I know. We don't disagree often.

Incidentally, would I be right in assuming that your lot are making sure that just as soon as people remember that climate change is real again, you'll be ready or are you being fake news'ed to death?

Oh God I don't even want to talk about it. I happen to be involved in commerce related work so I fly under the radar but it's like knowing the asteroid is going to hit on such and such a date but it's still a longish time off but not that long that it doesn't feel immanent.[/QUOTE]


I'm just a bit disappointed that those who can't see that the current fashion for high energy weather events is due to there being more energy in the system are not falling back on a displeased deity. Because Trump pretending to be a Christian would piss me off if I was a deity. Actually, using the logic displayed above, he does so I must be. Right, I'm off out for a bit of smiting.